This lecture considers the relationships between
children and
members of their family. Before you begin, you may find it useful to
focus on who you are
related to. This is not an experiment. There are no right / wrong
answers. Your responses
will not be recorded.
Write the first names of your relatives (if applicable) in these boxes :
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Now think about how much these people are concerned about your welfare.
| none | a lot | n/a | ||||||
| How much concern does your mother's mother (your grandmother) show about your welfare? | ||||||||
| How much concern does your mother's father (your grandfather) show about your welfare? | ||||||||
| How much concern does your father's mother (your grandmother) show about your welfare? | ||||||||
| How much concern does your father's mother (your grandmother) show about your welfare? | ||||||||
| How much concern does your mother's sister(s) - your aunt(s) - show about your welfare? | ||||||||
| How much concern does your mother's brother(s) - your uncle(s) - show about your welfare? | ||||||||
| How much concern does your father's sister(s) - your aunt(s) - show about your welfare? | ||||||||
| How much concern does your father's brother(s) - your uncle(s) - show about your welfare? |
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| Your mother's sister(s) | Your father's sister(s) | n/a | |
| Which aunt(s) is more concerned about your welfare? | |||
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| Your mother's brother(s) | Your father's brothers | n/a | |
| Which uncle(s) is more concerned about your welfare? | |||
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| Your mother's father | Your father's father | n/a | |
| Which grandfather is most concerned about your welfare? | |||
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| Your mother's mother | Your father's mother | n/a | |
| Which grandmother is most concerned about your welfare? | |||
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We will return to consider the pattern of your results later.
Hamilton's kin selection theory
Before beginning this section, view the video from Scientific American Frontiers "Masked Killers. Stronger Masked Booby chicks kill their smaller siblings to better ensure their own survival, and that of their mothers as well."
Relatives (kin) share many common genes. Genes can spread by benefiting other carriers of the same gene. Hamilton proposed the inclusive fitness or kin selection theory to explain altruism or self-sacrifice.
In an altruistic encounter there is:
The probability
that the altruist and the recipient share a gene is called the
coefficient of relatedness ( r ). The
diagram shows the extent to which we share genes with our relatives.
The value of r varies between 0 and 1. On average
we share half of our genes with our brothers, sisters and children ( r=0.5
), and a quarter of our genes are identical with those of our
grandchildren, nephews and nieces ( r=0.25 )
According to Hamilton's Rule altruism pays off if rb>c . In other words, shared genes will profit if the cost to the altruist is less than the benefit to the recipient multiplied by the probability that the recipient shares genes with the donor.
Costs and benefits are expressed in units of fitness or reproductive success with values between 0 and 1.
For the sake of argument assume you have spare food that you could give to your brother to feed him and his children.
We can test if your altruism would benefit kin selection by putting these values into Hamilton's Rule rb>c where:
You might wonder why b and c are not always equal. Why not use the spare food you have to increase your own reproductive success? Well there is a limit to how much you can eat. If you have an abundance of food and your brother is starving, the cost to you of sharing is small, but it may be a matter of life or death to your brother and his children.
According to a simple version of kin selection theory, men should give more resources to their genetic children than to stepchildren. Anderson et al (1999) looked at the odds that a man would give financial support to 'children' who were attending college. A man's children were classified into one of four types
| Man's relationship with child's mother
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| Man's
relationship with child
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Child's
mother is man's current partner
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Child's
mother is man's previous partner
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| Man is child's genetic father | Class 1 | Class 2 |
| Man is child's stepfather | Class 3 | Class 4 |
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Compared to a child fathered by the man, and
whose mother was the man's previous partner (Class 2 child),
Both of these effects are statistically significant. One surprising finding is that a man does not discriminate financially between a child who was born to the man's current partner in a previous relationship (Class 3 child), and a child fathered by the man in a previous relationship (Class 2 child) even though the man is genetically related to the class 2 child, but is only the stepfather of the Class 3 child Men may invest in the children of their current partners in order to convince the current partners that they are 'good providers' and thus persuade their current partner to bear him further children. Men may invest less in their own children from previous relationships because they are not sure that they are the true fathers of the children born whilst they were living with their previous partners: 'paternity uncertainty' |
| Trivers applied
Hamilton's mathematical formula for kin selection to within-family
conflict. According to Trivers:
"Parents are classically assumed to allocate investment in their young in such a way as to maximize the number surviving, while offspring are assumed to be passive vessels into which parents pour the appropriate care. Once one imagines offspring as actors in this interaction, then conflict must be assumed to lie at the heart of sexual reproduction itself-an offspring attempting from the very beginning to maximize its reproductive success would presumably want more investment than its parent is selected to give" (Trivers, 1974). |
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Here is a section from Buss (1999) which illustrates how conflict can arise from the application of the principles of kin selection.
"Suppose you have one sibling who has the same reproductive value as you. Your mother comes home from a day of gathering with two food items to feed her children. As with many resources, there are diminishing returns associated with each increase in consumption - that is, the value of the first unit of food consumed is higher than the value of the second unit of food. The first unit of food, for example, may prevent starvation, whereas the second unit of food just makes you a little fuller and fatter. Let's say that the first item would raise your reproductive success by four units and the second item of food would raise it an additional three units. Your sibling's consumption of these food items would have the same result, with diminishing returns associated with each added food item.
Now comes the conflict. From your mother's perspective, the ideal allocation would be to give one unit of food to you and one to your sibling. This would net her eight units of increase, four for you and four for your sibling. If either you or your sibling monopolized all the food, however, the gain would only be seven (four for the first item plus three for the second). So from your mother's perspective an equal allocation between her children would yield the best outcome.
From your perspective, however, you are twice as valuable as your sibling--you have 100 percent of your genes, whereas your sibling only has 50 percent of your genes (on average). Therefore, your mother's ideal allocation would benefit you by the four units that you receive plus only two of the units that your sibling receives (since you benefit by only 50 percent of whatever your sibling receives), for a total of six units benefit. If you manage to get all the food, however, you benefit by seven units (four for the first item plus three for the second). Therefore, from your perspective the ideal allocation in this simplified example would be for you to get all the food and your sibling none. This conflicts with your mother's ideal allocation, which is to distribute equally, however. The general conclusion is this: The theory of parent-offspring conflict predicts that each child will generally desire a larger portion of the parents' resources than the parents want to give. Although the above example is simplified in various ways, this general conclusion applies even when siblings differ in their value to the parents and even when the parents have only a single child. If the parents were to go along with the ideal allocation of resources desired by the child, it would take away from other channels through which the parents might be reproductively successful. Interestingly, parent-child conflict over the parent's resources is predicted not merely to occur at particular times such as adolescence, but at each stage of life (Daly & Wilson, 1988).
The theory of parent-offspring conflict yields a number of specific hypotheses that can be tested: (1) parents and children will get into conflict about the time at which the child should be weaned, with the parents generally wanting to wean the child sooner and the child wanting to continue to receive resources longer; (2) parents will encourage children to value their siblings more than children are naturally inclined to value them; and (3) parents will tend to punish conflict between siblings and reward cooperation. " Buss (1999).
This table shows how various allocations of food affect each relative's inclusive fitness
Assume that:
| Mother's fitness | Offspring A's fitness | Offspring B's fitness | |
| Offspring A gets 2 units of food | value
of 2 units of food to offspring A * coefficient of relatedness between
mother and offspring A = 7*0.5 = 3.5 |
value of 2 units of food
to offspring A * coefficient of relatedness between offspring A and
recipient of food (offspring A) = 7*1 = 7 Best strategy for offspring A |
value
of 2 units of food to offspring A * coefficient of relatedness between
offspring B and recipient of food (offspring A) = 7*0.5 = 3.5 |
| Offspring B gets 2 units of food | value
of 2 units of food to offspring B * coefficient of relatedness between
mother and offspring B = 7*0.5 = 3.5 |
value
of 2 units of food to offspring B * coefficient of relatedness between
offspring A and recipient of food (offspring B) = 7*0.5 = 3.5 |
value of 2 units of food
to offspring B * coefficient of relatedness between offspring B and
recipient of food (offspring B) = 7*1 = 7 Best strategy for offspring B |
| A and B each get 1 unit of food | value of 1 unit of food
to offspring A * coefficient of relatedness between mother and
offspring A + value of 1 unit of food to offspring B * coefficient of
relatedness between mother and offspring B = (4*0.5) +(4*0.5) = 2+2 = 4 Best strategy for mother |
value
of 1 unit of food to offspring A * coefficient of
relatedness between offspring A and recipient of food (offspring A) +
value of 1 unit of food to offspring B * coefficient of
relatedness between offspring A and recipient of food (offspring B) = (4*1)+(4*0.5) = 4+2 = 6 |
value
of 1 unit of food to offspring B * coefficient of
relatedness between offspring B and recipient of food (offspring B) +
value of 1 unit of food to offspring A * coefficient of
relatedness between offspring B and recipient of food (offspring A) = (4*1)+(4*0.5) = 4+2 = 6 |
Conflict arises between
the mother and her offspring because
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Before beginning this section, view the video from Scientific American Frontiers "Masked Killers. Stronger Masked Booby chicks kill their smaller siblings to better ensure their own survival, and that of their mothers as well."
Note that although this scenario is often described in terms of parent-offspring conflict, there is also conflict between the offspring for the mother's resources.
Potential conflict between siblings is magnified if they are only half siblings i.e. the offspring have separate fathers, but the same mother. This table shows how reducing the coefficient of relatedness from 0.5 (full siblings ) to 0.25 (half siblings ) affects the fitness outcomes.
Assume that:
| Mother's fitness | Offspring A's fitness | Offspring B's fitness | |
| Offspring A gets 2 units of food | value
of 2 units of food to offspring A * coefficient of relatedness between
mother and offspring A = 7*0.5 = 3.5 |
value of 2 units of food
to offspring A * coefficient of relatedness between offspring A and
recipient of food (offspring A) = 7*1 = 7 Best strategy for offspring A |
value of 2 units of food
to offspring A * coefficient of relatedness between offspring B and
recipient of food (offspring A) = 7*0.25 = 1.75 |
| Offspring B gets 2 units of food | value
of 2 units of food to offspring B * coefficient of relatedness between
mother and offspring B = 7*0.5 = 3.5 |
value of 2 units of food
to offspring B * coefficient of relatedness between offspring A and
recipient of food (offspring B) = 7*0.25 = 1.75 |
value of 2 units of food
to offspring B * coefficient of relatedness between offspring B and
recipient of food (offspring B) = 7*1 = 7 Best strategy for offspring B |
| A and B each get 1 unit of food | value of 1 unit of food
to offspring A * coefficient of relatedness between mother and
offspring A + value of 1 unit of food to offspring B * coefficient of
relatedness between mother and offspring B = (4*0.5) +(4*0.5) = 2+2 = 4 Best strategy for mother |
value
of 1 unit of food to offspring A * coefficient of
relatedness between offspring A and recipient of food (offspring A) +
value of 1 unit of food to offspring B * coefficient of
relatedness between offspring A and recipient of food (offspring B) = (4*1)+(4*0.25) = 4+1 = 5 |
value
of 1 unit of food to offspring B * coefficient of
relatedness between offspring B and recipient of food (offspring B) +
value of 1 unit of food to offspring A * coefficient of
relatedness between offspring B and recipient of food (offspring A) = (4*1)+(4*0.25) = 4+1 = 5 |
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The 'Wicked stepmother effect'
Assume
that:
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| Mother's fitness | Offspring A's fitness | Offspring B's fitness | |
| Offspring A gets 2 units of food | value of 2 units of food
to offspring A * coefficient of relatedness between mother and
offspring A = 7*0.5 = 3.5 Best strategy for mother |
value of 2 units of food
to offspring A * coefficient of relatedness between offspring A and
recipient of food (offspring A) = 7*1 = 7 Best strategy for offspring A |
value
of 2 units of food to offspring A * coefficient of relatedness between
stepchild B and recipient of food (offspring A) = 7*0 = 0 |
| Stepchild B gets 2 units of food | value
of 2 units of food to stepchild B * coefficient of relatedness between
mother and stepchild B = 7*0 = 0 |
value
of 2 units of food to stepchild B * coefficient of relatedness between
offspring A and recipient of food (stepchild B) = 7*0 = 0 |
value of 2 units of food
to stepchild B * coefficient of relatedness between offspring B and
recipient of food (offspring B) = 7*1 = 7 Best strategy for offspring B |
| A and B each get 1 unit of food | value of 1 unit of food
to offspring A * coefficient of relatedness between mother and
offspring A + value of 1 unit of food to stepchild B * coefficient of
relatedness between mother and stepchild B = (4*0.5) +(4*0) = 2+0 = 2 |
value
of 1 unit of food to offspring A * coefficient of
relatedness between offspring A and recipient of food (offspring A) +
value of 1 unit of food to stepchild B * coefficient of
relatedness between offspring A and recipient of food (stepchild B) = (4*1)+(4*0) = 4+0 = 4 |
value
of 1 unit of food to stepchild B * coefficient of
relatedness between stepchild B and recipient of food (stepchild B) +
value of 1 unit of food to offspring A * coefficient of
relatedness between stepchild B and recipient of food (offspring A) = (4*1)+(4*0) = 4+0 = 4 |
| Notice how an unequal allocation of resources between her offspring A and her stepchild B maximizes the fitness of the mother, and her own offspring A |
| Notice how an equal allocation of resources between her offspring A and her stepchild B does not maximize the fitness of either the mother, or her own offspring A |
Parent-offspring conflict begins before birth
Parent-off
spring conflict begins at the moment a mother's egg is fertilized by
the father's sperm (see Buss, 1999).
The foetus is a battleground for its parent's genes (see Rossano, 2003). Imprinted genes are unusual genes that only express their traits if they are inherited from one parent or the other.
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Seminar
topics
Unwanted children
Thinking about unwanted children releases a range of strong emotions in all of us. When dealing with this distressing topic it is useful to bear in mind the caveat that just because evolutionary psychology reveals something about human behaviour, this does not mean that human behaviour 'ought' to be this way, or that the behaviour is somehow biologically determined and inevitable.
Read Hrdy (2001). The
Past,Present,and Future of the Human Family. The Tanner Lectures on
Human Values Delivered at University of Utah February 27 and 28,2001. Available online and consider
the following questions:
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Read Barrett
et al (2002) Chapter 7 Parental Investment Strategies and consider the
following questions:
Read Rossano (2003) Females and the Mixed Strategy. In Chapter 12 (Cooperation Between the Sexes III: The Female Perspective ),Evolutionary Psychology: The Science of Human Behavior and Evolution, and consider the following questions:
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Figure redrawn from Barrett et al (2003) |
| Infanticide is a
relatively rare phenomenon, but it has been documented in virtually
every human society (see Barrett et al 2002). Infanticide is the
solution of last resort for people who need to drastically reduce
parental investment.
Read Barrett et al (2002) Chapter 7 Parental Investment Strategies and explain, with example, how each of the following situations could lead to infanticide:
Read Cartwright 2000, section 10.3.2 Infanticide) and consider the following questions:
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Figure redrawn from Cartwright (2000) |
"Having a step-parent has turned out to be the most powerful epidemiological risk factor for severe child maltreatment yet discovered." (Daly and Wilson, 1988 cited in Cartwright 2000 p 276).
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Read Cartwright 2000, section 10.3.2 Infanticide) and consider the following questions:
Locating mothers of abandoned children
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| In mid-December 2002 the
body of a baby, inside a black plastic bag, was found by contractors
clearing a site of rubbish outside a village in Cornwall. The
post-mortem revealed that the baby girl lived for a brief time, but
died from neglect.
The police must contact the mother because they are concerned for her welfare. They have launched house-to-house enquiries in the area. Police and Health Service representatives made a television appeal to the mother, and for help from the general public.
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In Germany
desperate mothers who do not want their babies are able to drop them
off anonymously through a chute at a Hamburg day care centre. A silent
alarm sounds, a camera watching the carrier turns on, and the baby is
monitored until a nurse arrives. The program, “Operation
Foundling,” was launched in Hamburg with the intent of
reducing the growing number of babies left abandoned.
Comment on these suggestions with reference to the literature you have read.
Does equality of parental investment disadvantage middle-borns?
Hertwig, Davis and Sulloway (2002) provide a model which shows that even when parents allocate investment equally between their children, it can still lead to inequalities as a consequence of a child's birth order.
The following table introduces three imaginary couples who all started their families in 1970. We will use these families to see how birth order affects allocation of resources within a family
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All three sets of parents were determined to allocate an equal amount of their resources (love, care, attention, time and money) to each of their children, and they supported each child until it was 19 years old.
For the sake of illustration, assume that each family has 100 units of resource to allocate to their children during any five year period.
This table shows how the impact of allocating resources equally between children in each of our families.
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| Years........ | 1st born | 1st born | 1st born | |||
| 1970-1974 | 100 | 100 | 2nd born | 100 | 2nd born | |
| 1975-1979 | 100 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 3rd born |
| 1980-1984 | 100 | 50 | 50 | 33 | 33 | 33 |
| 1985-1989 | 100 | 50 | 50 | 33 | 33 | 33 |
| 1990-1994 | 100 | 50 | 50 | |||
| 1995-1999 | 100 | |||||
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| Cumulative investment over 19 years | 400 | 250 | 250 | 217 | 167 | 217 |
| Investment in first five years of life | 100 | 100 | 50 | 100 | 50 | 33 |
| Investment in last five year of rearing | 100 | 50 | 100 | 33 | 50 | 100 |
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Note that equal investment in each child:
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Read
Hertwig, Davis and Sulloway (2002). Parental
Investment: How an Equity Motive Can Produce Inequality.
Psychological Bulletin, 128/5, 728-745. Available online and consider
the following questions:
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Seminar topic: Unwanted parents
Adolescence and the souring of parent-child relationships
There is a paradox at the heart of the relationship between parent and child. Adult fertility declines with age, therefore with the passage of time and accumulated parental investment, children become more and more valuable to their parents because they are able to reproduce. But at the same time, parents become a burden and impediment to increasingly independent children.
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Read
Developmental Patterns in Parent-Child Relationships
in Rossano (2003) Chapter 14 and consider the
following questions:
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Read "The Oedipal Complex Revisited" and 'Killing Parents and the Asymmetry of Valuing Parents and Children' in Buss (1999, Chapter 7)
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The brutal murder of
Jeremy Bamber's family shocked the nation in August 1985. With Bamber
standing to inherit his adoptive family's £500,000 fortune,
it was inevitable suspicion would fall on him. But Bamber, now 41, has
always denied shooting his parents, his sister and her six-year-old
twin sons at their Georgian farmhouse in Tolleshunt D'Arcy, Essex.
Bamber said his sister, who had not been taking her medication for mild schizophrenia, had "gone crazy", shooting her parents and children before killing herself. Sentencing Bamber to five life prison terms, the judge Mr Justice Drake said he was "warped and evil beyond belief". Bamber's appeals against conviction were rejected in 1989 and 2002 (From BBC News report: Thursday, 12 December, 2002)
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Review the information
you provided about the relationship you provided about the relationship
between you and your relatives at the beginning
of this topic, bearing in mind the following questions:
If you have children of your own, you may wish to consider how you perceive their relationships with their grandparents, uncles and aunts. |
Relative's investment in children
Read Buss (1999 p236-) and consider the following questions:
Resolution of parent-offspring conflict: An evolutionary unstable "arms race"
Read Kolliker and Richner (2001) Parent-offspring conflict and the genetics of offspring solicitation and parental response. Animal Behaviour, 62, 395-407. Available online.